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DEVELOPMENTS IN
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES
If the defendant in a criminal trial has a record of other offenses or is
suspected of a number of crimes although charged with only one, the ad-
missibility of evidence of these other offenses can be crucial. Admissi-
bility depends in part on the purpose for which the evidence is offered.
For instance, the prosecution is severely limited in its use of evidence of
character. Until the defendant submits evidence of his good character,
the subject cannot be raised1 and even after character is put in issue par-
ticular acts are not allowed to show character.2 The defendant's prior
convictions may be used to impeach his testimony, just as similar evidence
may be used to impeach any other witness. 3 These uses of other offenses
to establish character or to impeach testimony are outside the scope of
this article, which is concerned with evidence used in the prosecution's
case in chief.
The central problem concerning evidence of other offenses is that if
the defendant's other bad acts are proved, the jury might, wittingly or
unwittingly, use bad character as an intermediate step in a series of de-
ductions leading to the conclusion that the defendant should be con-
victed. 4 The evidence is excluded, "not because it has no appreciable
probative value, but because it has too much." 5 One purpose of this
article is to examine the meaning of that statement, the nature and valid-
ity of the assumptions underlying it, and the utility of the rules of ev-
idence built on it.
A recent line of cases in Minnesota 6 and a single case in Louisiana 7
1 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 57-58 (3d ed. 1940).
2 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 193; C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 191 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). Defendant's character witnesses may be asked on
cross-examination whether they have heard about certain other misdeeds of the
defendant. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
3 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 890. In some jurisdictions, e.g., New York, there are
limitations on the use of evidence of defendant's other crimes during cross-examina-
tion. Id. § 891.
4 Dean Wigmore stated the problem thus:
The impulse to argue from A's former bad deed or good deed directly
to his doing or not doing of the bad deed charged is perhaps a natural
one; but it will always be found, upon analysis of the process of reason-
ing, that there is involved in it a hidden intermediary step of some sort,
resting on a second inference of character, motive, plan, or the like.
This intermediate step is always implicit, and must be brought out.
I J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 192.
5 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 194.
6 State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, N.W.2d 281 (1967); State v. Spreigl, 272
Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965).
State v. Prieur, - La. -, 277 So. 2d 126 (1973).
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have established special procedures to be followed before and after ev-
idence of other crimes is received. This article also examines these pro-
cedures and evaluates their effectiveness in coping with the problems
presented by the admission of evidence of other offenses.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: THEORY
Two rules have evolved to ensure that juries will not determine pres-
ent guilt on the basis of character inferred from past acts. The exclusion-
ary rule, presently followed in most American jurisdictions, excludes all
evidence of other offenses unless it falls within stated exceptions.8 The
inclusionary rule,9 followed in the remaining jurisdictions,10 allows the
admission of evidence of other crimes when it is relevant for any purpose
other than demonstrating the defendant's character."
A. The Exclusionary Rule
Generally, evidence of other offenses committed by the accused is ex-
cluded. There are five generally accepted exceptions to the rule: such
evidence may be admitted for the purpose of proving motive;
12 intent;13
8E.g., Garner v. State, 269 Ala. 531, 114 So. 2d 385 (1959); State v. Curry, 97
Ariz. 191, 398 P.2d 899 (1965); Miller v. State, 239 Ark. 836, 394 S.W.2d 601 (1965);
Clews v. People, 151 Colo. 219, 377 P.2d 125 (1962); Wooten v. United States, 285
A.2d 308 (D.C. App. 1971); Lyles v. State, 215 Ga. 229, 109 S.E.2d 785 (1959); State
v. Hashimoto, 46 Haw. 183, 377 P.2d 728 (1962); People v. Walker, 34 I11. 2d 23,
213 N.E.2d 552 (1966); Schweinefuss v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1965);
Cole v. State, 232 Md. 111, 194 A.2d 278 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 980 (1964);
State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 NW.2d 167 (1965); Riley v. State, 254 Miss.
86, 180 So. 2d 321 (1965); State v. Niehoff, 395 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. 1965); State v.
Merritt, 138 Mont. 546, 357 P.2d 683 (1960); State v. Putnam, 178 Neb. 445, 133
N.W.2d 605 (1965); State v. Nystedt, 79 Nev. 24, 377 P.2d 929 (1963); State v. Sin-
nott, 24 N.J. 408, 132 A.2d 298 (1957); People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E.
286 (1901); State v. Brown, 231 Ore. 297, 372 P.2d 779 (1962); Commonwealth v.
Gockley, 411 Pa. 437, 192 A.2d 693 (1963); State v. Harris, 89 R.I. 202, 152 A.2d 106
(1959); State v. Brooks, 235 S.C. 344, 111 S.E.2d 686 (1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
300 (1961); Carroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464, 370 S.W.2d 523 (1963); Rees v. Common-
wealth, 203 Va. 850, 127 S.E.2d 406 (1962); State v. Sayward, 63 Wash. 2d 485, 387
P.2d 746 (1963); State v. Lindsay, 77 Wyo. 410, 317 P.2d 506 (1957).
9 Cf. Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV.
L. REV. 988 (1938). Stone refers to the inclusionary rule as the "original" and the
exclusionary rule as "spurious" in order to emphasize his view of the history of the
two rules.
10 E.g., United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973); People v. Woods, 35
Cal. 2d 504, 218 P.2d 981 (1950); State v' Jenkins, 158 Conn. 149, 256 A.2d 223
(1969); Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959);
State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9, 175 P.2d 1016 (1947).
11 Cf. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 311 (1942).
12 1 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 239 (12th ed. R. Anderson
1955).
13 1 F. WHARTON, supra note 12, § 237; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 302-03.
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absence of mistake or accident; 14 existence of a common plan or
scheme; 15 or the identity
16 of the actor.17
Intent, absence of mistake, and identity have been included as excep-
tions because they are elements of the crime charged and will be material
whenever they are in issue.' 8 The other purposes are included because
they can serve as intermediate steps' 9 in a chain of inference proceed-
ing logically to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty. For example,
a juror might use motive as an intermediate step, reasoning that because
the defendant committed act A, his desire to conceal A probably led him
to commit act B, the crime charged. If the other evidence in the case
were consistent with the defendant's guilt, but failed to prove it conclu-
sively or to explain why the defendant committed the crime, the proof of
act A might remove a juror's reasonable doubt. If the other offense does
not go to one of the excepted purposes, 20 it is excluded on the assump-
tion that a juror could decide to convict only by injecting the defendant's
character into the calculus: "Defendant committed offense A. Therefore
he is a bad man. Consequently he probably committed offense B, for
which he is on trial."' 21 A second suspect use of character evidence is
exemplified by the following line of reasoning: "Because defendant com-
mitted offense A, he is a bad man. Therefore, he should be sent to pri-
son. Consequently I will find him guilty regardless of whether he com-
mitted offense B, for which he is on ,trial."' "- By forbidding the prosecutor
14 1 F. WHARTON, supra note 12, § 236; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 302-03.
15 1 F. WHARTON, supra note 12, § 240; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 304.
16 1 F. WHARTON, supra note 12, § 235.
17 The leading case employing this list is People v, Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61
N.E. 286 (1901). While some courts treat the relationship between the defendant and
the victim as a sixth exception, e.g., State v. Donohue, 2 N.J. 381, 67 A.2d 152 (1949),
such an addition is not necessary, for if relevant at all, the relationship will tend to
prove one of the other exceptions. For example, in a homicide case, the state can
prove motive by establishing that the victim knew of the defendant's other crimes
and was threatening to expose them, e.g., State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242, 170 N.W.2d
104 (1969). In cases of sexual misconduct, particularly offenses like statutory rape
or incest not involving force, a continuing sexual relationship with the victim could
be considered a common plan or design.
Courts have historically been more willing to admit evidence of similar acts in
cases involving sex offenses. Even where the prior acts are relevant only to the char-
acter of the accused, courts have accepted the idea that a showing of "sexual per-
version" is more valuable than a showing of a tendency to commit some nonsexual
crime. This practice has been sharply criticized. See Gregg, Other Acts of Sexual
Misbehavior and Perversion as Evidence in Prosecutions for Sexual Offenses, 6 ARIZ.
L. REV. 212 (1965); Stone, supra note 9, at 103 1.
18 Stone, supra note 9, at 1026 n.190.
19 Id.
20 The essential difference between the exclusionary rule and the inclusionary rule
is that the former treats this list as exhaustive rather than illustrative. See part I B
inIra.
21 1 F. WHARTON, supra note 12, § 232; 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 194.
22 1 F. WHARTON, supra note 12, § 232; 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 194.
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to prove a defendant's character, the law seeks to prevent jurors from
following either of these patterns.
23
B. The Inclusionary Rule
Since the most common justification for the exclusionary rule is the
need to keep out evidence of the defendant's character, seemingly the
same purpose could be accomplished more directly by a test formulated
in character terms. Such a test is employed in a minority of jurisdic-
tions.2 4 Under this test, commonly called the inclusionary rule, evidence
of other offenses is admissible if it is relevant to any issue other than that
of the defendant's character.25
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: APPLICATION
The two rules are not as different as their names would suggest, and,
in most cases, they lead to the same result. Indeed, the contemporaneous
existence of both rules created confusion during the first part of the twen-
tieth century because judges and writers failed to distinguish them.
26
A. United States v. Woods
There are, however, cases in which the difference between the rules
can be decisive. The complicated facts of a recent Fourth Circuit case,
United States v. Woods,'27 illustrate the differences in application between
the two rules while indicating a trend toward acceptance of the inclusion-
ary rule. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder for the
death of her eight-month-old, pre-adoptive foster son, Paul. On five oc-
casions between August 4, and August 20, 1969, the baby was taken to
the hospital "gasping for breath and turning blue from lack of oxygen."
'28
Four times he responded to artificial resuscitation, but the fifth time he
went into a month-long coma and died. In none of the instances was the
reason for the baby's difficulty discovered. Prior to his placement in Mrs.
Woods' home at the age of five months, he was a "normal, healthy
baby."
29
A pathologist who examined Paul's medical history and performed an
autopsy ,testified that he found no evidence of natural death or accident.
He said he was 75 percent certain that Paul died of homicide by smother-
ing. The pathologist's only doubt was attributed to the possibility of an un-
known disease.
23 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 191; 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 193.
24 See note 10 supra.
25 Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959); Day
v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 907, 86 S.E.2d 23 (1955).
26 Stone, supra note 9, at 1034-37.
27 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973).
28 Id. at 129.
29 Id.
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To remove this doubt, the government showed that, over a period of
twenty-five years, defendant had custody of, or access to, nine children
who experienced at least twenty instances of cyanosis30 among them.
Six of the other children died, including defendant's three natural children
and two she had adopted. The death certificates of the six children
showed specific natural causes, including bronchiolitis, diphtheria, and as-
phyxiation due to mucous plug. Autopsies were performed in only two
cases. 31 The government showed that three of 'the listed causes of death
were medically impossible.
32
Considering the admissibility of -this evidence the court said:
[W] ith regard to no single child was there any legally sufficient
proof -that defendant had done any act which the law forbids.
Only when all of the evidence concerning the nine other chil-
dren and Paul is considered collectively is the conclusion im-
pelled that the probability that some or all of the other deaths
[and] cyanotic seizures... were accidental or attributable to
natural causes was so remote, the truth must be that Paul and
some or all of the other children died at the hands of the defen-
dant.
33
If this evidence of a long pattern of unexplained similar incidents had
been excluded, the defendant would almost surely have gone free; since
the evidence was admitted, she was convicted.
The court's dictum to the contrary notwithstanding,34 the case would
be difficult to bring within any of the recognized exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule. The lack-of-accident exception is probably inappropriate
because, as the court conceded,35 it is ordinarily invoked only if -the de-
fendant admits the act but contends that either the act or the result was
accidental. 36 Similarly, the identity exception is usually applied when a
series of criminal acts are tied to the act with which defendant is charged
by pervasive common features. Woods involved an extraordinary series
of events, none of which could be shown to be unnatural standing alone,
much less the criminal handiwork of the particular defendant. Thus, the
evidence was used to show not just -the -identity of the actor but the exis-
tence of acts. To admit such evidence under the identity exception would
stretch the exception to the breaking point.
The dissenting judge in Woods disputed the court's conclusion that
these exceptions applied, but found it unnecessary to give detailed rea-
30 Cyanosis is a bluish discoloration due to deficient oxygenation of the blood.
31 Id. at 143 n.10 (Widener, J., dissenting).
32Id. at 130-31. The dissenting judge objected that this evidence was of very
doubtful competency because the events were remote in time, and the testifying phy-
sician had not examined, attended, or performed autopsies on any of the children.
Id. at 143 n.10.
33Id. at 133.
34 Id. at 134.
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 300-05, 61 N.E. 286, 297-99 (1901).
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sons.37 The principal -theory of ,the dissent was that the prosecution must
show, as part of the corpus delicti of murder, that a criminal agency
caused the death and that evidence of prior occurrences is not admissible
to prove the corpus delicti even if an appropriate exception to the exclu-
sionary rule exists. 38 This analysis seems unsatisfactory. If the defend-
ant's intent is at issue, the state can show that death was not the result
of an accident only -by proving -intent. Evidence of other crimes is freely
admissible to prove intent which, in such a case, is necessary to prove
that a crime has taken place. 39 The soundest 'basis for a dissent in Woods
arguably would be the failure of the evidence to fit any of the recognized
exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
The court did not rest its affirmance of Woods' conviction on the
ground that the evidence satisfied an exception to the exclusionary rule
however. Rather, it decided that evidence of other crimes should be ad-
missible whenever such evidence is relevant for any purpose other than
to show the defendant's propensity toward crime, unless, in 'the opinion of
the trial judge, its probative value is outweighed by "a substantial danger
of undue prejudice to -the accused."'40 Thus, the court adopted the inclu-
sionary rule.
The three cases 41 cited by the court 'to support its test of admissibility
are inapposite. All of them concern identification testimony involving the
use of photographs that might have given rise to an inference of prior
difficulty with the law. Two of these cases 42 held that "mug shots" which
had been identified by a witness were admissible. The third reached the
same result with an ordinary snapshot, even -though the same court had
previously held "mug shots" inadmissible.
43
More substantial federal authority for the Woods decision does exist,
however. United States v. Stirone44 was an extortion case in which the
3T 484 F.2d at 139 (Widener, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 142-44.
39 While some authority supports Judge Widener's position, e.g., Kahn v. State,
182 Ind. 1, 105 N.E. 385 (1914), there is no established rule to that effect. In People
v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286-(1901), the court reviewed a number of
English homicide cases in which evidence of prior unexplained deaths was admitted
and concluded:
[T]he only two theories upon which the rulings therein . . . could be
defended are, first, that the killing may have been accidental, or,
second, that the cause of death was in doubt. In the one instance proof
of other deaths in the same family, under similar circumstances ....
may have been the only evidence obtainable to prove a felonious kill-
ing....
Id. at 304, 61 N.E. at 298.
40 484 F.2d at 134.
41 United States v. Hines, 470 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968
(1973); United States v. Hallman, 439 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Dirring v. United
States, 328 F.2d 512 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
42 United States v. Hines, 470 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968
(1973); Dirring v. United States, 328 F.2d 512 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003
(1964).
43 United States v. Hallman, 439 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
44 262 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
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defendant admitted receiving the -payment in question, but testified that
it was a legitimate commission. In rebuttal, the government introduced
evidence of later extortions. The court thought the evidence relevant to
explain the defendant's purpose or intent in soliciting the payment which
was the subject of the indictment, but stated that admissibility should be
governed by the inclusionary rule. 45 If the Woods court had chosen to
uphold the exclusionary rule, Stirone would not have presented a major
problem, since its statement of the inclusionary rule could have been dis-
missed as dictum. Nor would the cases actually cited46 in Woods have
been troublesome; not only are they distinguishable on their facts, but
their bothersome language comes from Stirone.
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence
If the inclusionary rule was not the law in the federal courts before
Woods, it probably soon will be because the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence adopt it. Under these rules, all relevant evidence is admis-
sible, 47 subject to exclusion at the discretion of the court if its probative
value is outweighed by the danger of prejudice.48 Evidence of other
crimes is not admissible to prove "the character of a person in order to
show that he acted in conformity ,therewith.' '49
Both the Woods rule 5° and proposed Rule 403 allow the trial judge
to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if its probative value is not suffi-
cient to warrant the attendant risk of prejudice. This discretion presents a
difficult problem for trial judges and appellate courts, since they must
determine the limits of such discretion.
The facts of Woods5 1 present an excellent illustration of the choice that
courts must make. Under one view of the facts, the deaths and respiratory
attacks may have all been accidental or natural. Even though, when the
evidence is considered collectively, it becomes extremely unlikely that all
of the incidents can be ascribed to accidental or natural causes, it does not
follow that "the truth must be that Paul and some or all of the other chil-
dren died at the hands of the defendant. '5 2 The italicized words make
45 262 F.2d at 576-77. The court cited with approval Stone, supra note 9, and
then ignored the thesis of that article, which emphasized the existence of two distinct
rules, saying:
So, the general rule, as stated by most courts, is [the exclusionary
rule] .... [W]e think the rule may be stated a little less mechanically.
Evidence of other offenses may be received if relevant for any purpose
other than to show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the
defendant to commit the crime.
Id. at 576.
4 6 See note 41 supra.
47 F.R. EvID. 402. The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence are set forth in the
insert to 93 S. Ct. at 1-161 (1973).
48 F.R. EvID. 403.
49 F.R. EvID. 404(b).
50 484 F.2d at 134.
51 United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973). See part I B supra.
52 484 F.2d at 133 (emphasis added).
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the statement a non sequitur. If "some or all" of the children died at the
hands of the defendant, some of them may also have died of natural
causes and Paul cannot be assigned to one group or the other solely on
the basis of the pattern of seizures. If the defendant actually killed the six
other children and Paul died of natural causes, she should have been ac-
quitted since she was only on trial for Paul's death.
However, "all of the evidence" included the direct testimony about
Paul by the examining pathologist; 3 he believed that Paul died by
smothering. This opinion was corroborated by the evidence of similar
deaths. Paul could have died of natural causes, but, as one learns more
about the other children, it becomes increasingly difficult to believe that
he did. The fact that Judges Winter and Field seem to have come rather
close to confusing proof that Mrs. Woods killed some or all of the chil-
dren with proof that she killed Paul lends weight to fears that jurors
would be subject to the same sort of confusion. If there was no direct
evidence that Paul's death was a homicide, a guilty verdict could only
result from such confusion. In these circumstances, evidence of other inci-
dents should never be admissible, because its probative value is simply
not great enough to support a conviction. The greater the danger of jury
confusion or willfully improper conviction (convicting the defendant of
offense A to punish him for committing offense B), the more clearly the
evidence should indicate the defendant's guilt in order to be admissible.
Careful empirical studies will be needed to determine what kinds of
evidence are really prejudicial in given situations. Without such studies,
courts' decisions will be founded on assumptions which, although based on
the accumulated experience of judges and lawyers, have never been tested
under controlled conditions.
C. The Exclusionary Rule in Practice
The problems arising under the exclusionary rule are somewhat differ-
ent. Courts following it tend to substitute a pigeon-holing process for anal-
ysis of evidentiary relevance. 54 At times this process has even led to the
admission of evidence which would have been inadmissible under the
seemingly more permissive inclusionary rule.55 Listing exceptions to the
exclusionary rule is easy, but they are hard to apply. For example, in
some poisoning cases, 56 in which a number of people in the same relation
to defendant died under similar mysterious circumstances, it is difficult to
fit the evidence relating to other deaths within any of the excepted cat-
egories; i.e., there may be differing motives,5 7 or intent may be inferred
53 Id. at 130.
54 See Stone, supra note 9, at 1011-33.
55 Id. at 1031-33.
56 E.g., People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901); Farrer v. State, 2
Ohio St. 54 (1853).
57 In Molineux, the motive in one case was jealousy, in the other, simple hatred.
Even if all the poisonings were done, say, to inherit property, the rule could lead to
confusion; if different property is involved, is it the same motive?
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from the act. When two different people are killed for two different rea-
sons, there can hardly be a common scheme or plan, but when there are
similar reasons, e.g., to collect life insurance, is there a single plan or two
different ones? The further apart the two events are in time, the more
difficult the question becomes. The most likely category is the identity of
the perpetrator, but even this classification sometimes fails because of a
narrow reading of the exception. 58 This narrow construction can result in
the exclusion of genuinely relevant evidence.5 9 The source of judicial
difficulties with the rule would seem to be the rule itself.
III. THE CHOICE OF THE BEST RULE
Although the exclusionary and inclusionary rules sometimes lead to dif-
ferent results, they have a common purpose. It is important, therefore, to
consider which rule better achieves that purpose. Certain assumptions are
common to both rules. They are predicated on the notion that the jury is
likely to be prejudiced by evidence of the defendant's prior misdeeds, but
the danger of prejudice is outweighed by other considerations when the
other acts tend to establish an element of the presently charged crime.
A. Prejudice as Increased Probability
of an Unfavorable Verdict
The term "prejudice" is itself confusing; some courts use the word as a
synonym for an increased probability of an unfavorable verdict and admit
"prejudicial" evidence.60 A recent study by the London School of Eco-
nomics Jury Project61 indicates that evidence of other crimes is prejudi-
58 In Molineux, Mrs. Adams died from poison accidentally administered to her by
Cornish, who had received the poison in an anonymously sent box of Bromo-Seltzer.
It was proved that the defendant had rented a letter box in the name of Cornish.
The questioned evidence was that the defendant had previously taken a letter box in
the name of Barnet, that Barnet had died from the same poison mixed in a box
of "Kutnow," a remedy for impotence, and that defendant had used the letter box to
order "Kutnow." The court held that this evidence was outside the identity excep-
tion because "none of the letters in the one series . . . throw any light upon the
matters referred to in the other .. " People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 317, 61
N.E. 286, 303 (1901). A more liberal interpretation of the identity exception would
be that "the facts and circumstances of the Barnet case and the Cornish case were
of such a character that they must necessarily have resulted from the action of a
single mind." 168 N.Y. at 348, 61 N.E. at 315 (Parker, C.J., dissenting).
59 Referring again to Molineux, the evidence about the Barnet letter box was rele-
vant to explain the one unexplained fact in the chain of circumstantial evidence tying
the defendant to Mrs. Adams' death. Stone, supra note 9, at 1028-29.
60 The following language is typical: "The fact that evidence is prejudicial does
not make it incompetent. All the evidence which plaintiff intr6duced to make out a
case was necessarily prejudicial." Ingram v. Prairie Block Coal Co., 319 Mo. 644,
656, 5 S.W.2d 413, 418 (1928).
61 London School of Economics Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973
CRIM. L. REV. (Eng.) 208 [hereinafter cited as L.S.E. Study]. The study used groups
of jurors who listened to tape recordings reenacted from transcripts of actual trials.
The content of the trials was varied to allow measurement of the effect of the vari-
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cial in this sense. The experimenters employed two basic cases, a theft
and a rape, and varied the evidence admitted. The likelihood of convic-
tion increased by a statistically significant margin when evidence of sim-
ilar offenses was introduced, but no increase was observed when evidence
of dissimilar offenses was admitted. For example, when evidence of a
prior conviction for indecency was admitted in the theft case, the in-
crease in convictions was insignificant. 62 In the rape case, the introduc-
tion of evidence of a prior conviction for "dishonesty" was associated with
a significant decrease in votes for conviction.63 The findings cast doubt on
the "bad man" hypothesis, for if the jurors believed that a defendant's
guilt could be established by proof that he was a criminal, there would
have been more guilty verdicts even when dissimilar crimes were proven.
It is possible, however, that the jurors followed a slightly more sophisti-
cated version of the "bad man" pattern,64 reasoning that the defendant
was a sex offender or a thief rather than simply a bad man.
In other parts of the same study, seemingly illogical verdicts suggest the
existence of prejudice. For example, in the rape case, evidence that one
defendant had been previously convicted of indecent assaults produced a
significant increase in guilty verdicts against his codefendant as well as
against him, 65 and evidence of a dissimilar crime produced an actual de-
crease in convictions.
66
While the London School of Economics Study indicated that juries do
take evidence of other offenses in-to account in some circumstances and
ations on the jurors. The individual jurors' votes were recorded before and after de-
liberations, and the deliberations were observed. Although the jurors were aware
that they were not deciding the fate of a real defendant, the study found them "deeply
immersed, entirely serious, often vehemently argumentative, to all appearances en-
tirely oblivious that the situation was only an experiment." Id. at 210.
62 Id. at 217, 222.
63 Id. at 218. This effect even operated in favor of a codefendant of the defendant
whose record was admitted.
64 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
65 L.S.E. Study, supra note 61, at 218. In the case of the defendant without a prior
record, the number of convictions for attempted rape was much higher than those
for rape, an effect described as "guilt by association ... tempered by compromise."
Id. The guilt by association, if not the compromise, may be less irrational than it
originally appears. Defendant A's prior criminal record may reinforce the victim's
testimony, making what she says about defendant B more credible as well. It may
well be that this effect should still be considered prejudicial, especially since the evi-
dence shows only that A has a tendency to commit sexual assaults, apparently of a
less extreme nature than rape.
66 See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra. Although nothing in the jurors'
discussions accounts for this phenomenon, the authors ascribe it to a feeling that it
was unfair to introduce such "prejudicial, marginally relevant evidence." L.S.E. Study,
supra note 61, at 218. Another possible explanation is that the jurors believed the
prosecutor thought his case was weak and, therefore, concluded that the case must
in fact have been weak. While the exclusionary rule was formulated to prevent
prejudice against the defendant, the existence of a prodefendant prejudice would in-
dicate that jurors' decisions are not always based on rational deductions from the evi-
dence presented at trial, thereby lending support to the arguments for exclusion.
Prejudice in either direction is troubling to anyone who hopes that every guilty
defendant is convicted and every innocent one goes free.
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that such cognizance increases convictions, it did not establish that such
evidence causes more wrongful convictions. This suggests that another
usage of the word prejudice would be more appropriate in the context of
admitting evidence of other crimes.
B. Prejudice as Increased Probability
of a Verdict Contrary to Fact
Some courts use the word prejudice only in reference to evidence that
may lead the jury to a decision contrary to fact.6 7 Accepting this concept
of prejudice, it becomes harder to test experimentally the hypothesis that
evidence of other crimes is prejudicial to the defendant. A mock trial can
easily be presented to two groups of jurors, deleting evidence of other
crimes for one group and not the other, but the results would indicate
only whether the evidence increases the probability of conviction, not
whether the increase in convictions was in any sense improper. If it could
be empirically proved that juries hearing evidence of other crimes will
convict more guilty defendants, but not more innocent ones, than juries
lacking such knowledge, then arguably the criminal justice system would
be improved by discarding both the inclusionary and exclusionary rules
and allowing the free admission of such evidence. But the rule that ev-
idence of other misconduct may not be received if it is relevant only to
demonstrate the bad character of the defendant is deeply ingrained in
our law.68 It is hard to imagine how one could amass proof of the rule's
worthlessness which would be so convincing as to induce an appropriate
forum to discard it.
It is apparent, then, that empirical research into the jury's ability to
handle character evidence without prejudice is unlikely to result in
changes in courtroom practice. More information is needed, however,
about the ways in which evidence of various kinds of other crimes, intro-
duced for permissible purposes at trial, affects jury behavior. The exclu-
sionary rule in its common form is preferable to the inclusionary rule if
evidence admitted because of one of the exceptions is less likely to cause
prejudice 69 than evidence outside the exceptions but still relevant to an
issue in the case. For example, it is often said that, under the exclusion-
ary rule, evidence of other crimes is not admissible to prove the corpus
delicti.70 This rule should be discarded unless it conforms to a real dif-
ference between the prejudicial effect of evidence proving the corpus
delicti and that of evidence falling within any of the standard exceptions.
Only careful study can determine whether the rule conforms to reality or
67 E.g., State v. Thornton, 108 Ariz. 119, 121, 493 P.2d 902, 904 (1972); State v.
Peke, 70 N.M. 108, 114, 371 P.2d 226, 230 (1962); Sonker-Galamba Corp. v. Hilman
111 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
6 8 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
69 It should be kept in mind that "prejudice" as used herein means a danger of a
wrongly unfavorable verdict. See note 67 and accompanying text supra. Thus, a
higher probative value would be reflected as diminished prejudice.
70 See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
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not. Research may also help answer other questions about the exclu-
sionary rule, such as whether other crimes should be admissible to prove
intent only when the commission of the act is not in issue and the act is
not one which by its nature implies intent. The list of exceptions could be
expanded, contracted, or simply replaced by the inclusionary rule on the
basis of the experimental results.
In the absence of such knowledge, the inclusionary rule seems to be
the most rational approach available. The rule is simpler and should not
cause a significant increase in admission of prejudicial evidence.
IV. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
The effort to strike a proper balance between prejudice and proof of
guilt has recently taken a new turn in Minnesota and Louisiana. Because
the substantive rules of evidence were found inadequate to deal with the
problems created by evidence of other crimes, the courts in these two
states have created procedural safeguards that act as an additional barrier
to the admission of such evidence. The Minnesota cases will be considered
first because that state has the longer experience with the new rules.
A. Minnesota
The leading Minnesota case is State v. Spreigl,71 in which the court
held that the prosecution must give notice of its intention to prove other
offenses within a reasonable time before trial. 72 The notice must specify
what other offenses will be proved, "described with the particularity re-
quired of an indictment or information. ' 73 Three classes of other offenses
are excepted from this requirement: those which are part of the same
immediate episode as the offense charged; those for which the defendant
was previously prosecuted; and those introduced to rebut the defendant's
evidence of good character.74 Clearly the main problem addressed by
this decision is the element of surprise. Even where the defendant's prior
misconduct is unquestionably relevant, he should have an ample oppor-
tunity to dispute the truth of the prosecution's evidence on the subject.
The first two exceptions, therefore, are quite sensible; they are matters of
which defense counsel should be aware without notice from the state.
Evidence introduced to rebut the defendant's evidence of good character
is somewhat different. The prosecutor cannot know in advance whether
the defendant will introduce evidence of his good character. It seems un-
fair to allow the defendant to condition his calling of character witnesses
upon knowledge of how much evidence the prosecution is prepared to
use in rebuttal. This exception may reflect a tendency to view the trial as
a sporting proposition; the defendant can raise the issue of his character,
71 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965).
72 272 Minn. at 496-97, 139 N.W.2d at 173.
73 272 Minn. at 497, 139 N.W.2d at 173.
74 Id.
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but only if he is willing to take his chances on the strength of the prosecu-
tion's rebuttal evidence.
Some fifteen months after Spreigl, the Minnesota court again dealt with
evidence of other offenses, this time setting forth procedures to be fol-
lowed during the trial. In State v. Billstrom7" the defendant was con-
victed of the armed robbery of a St. Paul bar. Over objections, witnesses
were allowed to identify defendant in connection with a similar robbery
and an attempted robbery, both of which occurred within a two-week
period in the same general area as the robbery charged. Since Minnesota
follows the exclusionary rule, 76 the issue on appeal was whether the dis-
puted evidence came within any of the recognized exceptions. Although
the briefs concentrated on the "common plan or scheme" exception, the
court brushed that issue aside and affirmed, finding the evidence admissi-
ble to establish identity. 77 The court seized the opportunity to expand the
procedural safeguards delineated in Spreigl.
In addition to the pretrial notice required by Spreigl, the court required
the prosecution to specify the applicable exception to -the exclusionary
rule at the time the evidence is offered. 78 If the evidence is received for
the purpose of identity, there must be "some relationship in time, location
or modus operandi between the crime charged and the other offenses,"
79
and even then the trial court must find that the evidence of defendant's
identity is "otherwise weak or inadequate,"8 0 making evidence of other
crimes "necessary to support the state's burden of proof." 8'
The evidence of defendant's participation in the other crimes must be
clear and convincing.8 2 The jury should be admonished as to the limited
purpose of the evidence both at the time of its admission and in the final
charge:
It is the court's duty to advise the jury in unequivocal language
that defendant is not being tried and may not be convicted for
any offense except that charged, warning them that to convict
for other offenses may result in unjust double punishment. 83
75 276 Minn. 174, 149 N.W.2d 281 (1967).
76 276 Minn. at 176-77, 149 N.W.2d at 283.
77 276 Minn. at 176, 149 N.W.2d at 283.
78 276 Minn. at 178, 149 N.W.2d at 284. The court cited Stanmore v. People, 146
Colo. 445, 362 P.2d 1042 (1961); this rule has existed in Colorado since Jaynes v.
People, 44 Colo. 535, 99 P. 325 (1908).
79 276 Minn. at 178, 149 N.W.2d at 284.
80 Id.
81 276 Minn. at 178-79, 149 N.W.2d at 284; cf. F.R. EvIo. 403. In the Billstrom
case itself, the latter requirement was apparently satisfied because the defense used
alibi witnesses to dispute the identifications by the bar owner and an employee who
left shortly before the robbery.
82 276 Minn. at 179, 149 N.W.2d at 285.
83id. Although this seems to be the Minnesota court's first statement on limiting
instructions, similar rules were well established in a number of other jurisdictions.
Baker v. United States, 310 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963);
State v. Finley, 85 Ariz. 327, 338 P.2d 790 (1959); People v. Shockey, 66 Ill. App. 2d
245, 213 N.E.2d 107, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 887 (1966); People v. Manchester, 235
Mich. 594, 209 N.W. 815 (1926).
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Subsequent cases have partially undercut these guidelines. In State v.
Houge,8 4 the defendant had been arraigned on a forgery charge forty
days before his trial, but the Spreigl notice pertaining to a second forgery
incident was served only one day before trial. The court acknowledged
that such unnecessarily tardy notice was not good practice, but affirmed
the conviction, because "the state's eleventh-hour filing, even if erroneous,
did not in this case constitute prejudicial error." 85 The rest of the state's
case was so convincing that it was "hardly conceivable that the cumulative
evidence relating to the Charles Jewelry check could have had decisive
impact on the trial court's determination."8 6 Thus, in almost the same
breath, the court drastically limited the Spreigl requirement of notice a
reasonable time before trial and the Billstrom prohibition of cumulative
evidence.
8 7
If Houge left any doubt about the limited scope of the rule against cu-
mulative evidence, State v. Whelan88 removed it. In a trial for sexual
intercourse with a child, the victim's mother was allowed to testify that
"She said it happened three times."8 9 The court held that it was error to
allow this testimony, resting its holding upon Spreigl. 0 But for Spreigl,
the evidence would have been admitted because other acts of sexual mis-
conduct with the same victim are admissible in Minnesota. 91 Once again,
the court affirmed the conviction because the error was not prejudicial,
92
and disdained even a nod at Billstrom. To the assertion that there was
ample evidence to convict without the erroneous testimony, 93 the court
added three makeweight arguments: the prosecutor had not pursued the
objectionable answer in his examination of the witness; he had not re-
ferred to it in final argument; and the court had given a limiting instruc-
tion.9 4 The first two are of dubious relevance, while both a limiting in-
struction and a finding of necessity are required under Billstrom. Thus, the
safeguards announced in Billstrom have been strictly limited to cases in
84 280 Minn. 372, 158 N.W.2d 265 (1968).
85 280 Minn. at 376, 159 N.W.2d at 268.
86 280 Minn. at 377, 159 N.W.2d at 268 (emphasis added).
87 Concededly, this case was tried before the supreme court's decision in Billstrorn,
which was prospective in its application. Still, the court's failure to give even a cur-
sory glance at its holding in Billstrom is shocking, and this failure is not limited to
cases tried before Billstroin. See text at notes 97-103 infra.
88 291 Minn. 83, 189 N.W.2d 170 (1971).
89 291 Minn. at 88, 189 N.W.2d at 174.
90 291 Minn. at 90, 189 N.W.2d at 175.
91 291 Minn. at 89-90, 189 N.W.2d at 175.
92 291 Minn. at 90-91, 189 N.W.2d at 175-76.
93 This seems somewhat questionable since the victim was apparently retarded, the
corroborating evidence came from her ten-year-old sister, and the court refused to
order a deposition from a witness, then in Vietnam, who was prepared to testify that
the same child had previously made false accusations of a similar nature against him.
291 Minn. at 85-87, 189 N.W.2d at 173.
94 291 Minn. at 90-91, 189 N.W.2d at 175-76. There is no indication in the opinion
that a similar instruction was given at the time of the testimony as required under
Billstrom.
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which the evidence is admitted under .the identity exception, 5 even -though
the reasons for the safeguards seem generally applicable to evidence of
other crimes.
Another inroad on Spreigl was the decision in State v. Boyce.96 The
court found, in this homicide case, that evidence of other crimes was not
subject to the notice requirement if it bore directly on the prior relation-
ship of the victim to the accused. Although this is not one of 'the kinds of
other offenses which Spreigl expressly excluded from its coverage,97 the
rationale was similar:
We are certain that this defendant was aware, as he had reason
to be, that his prior relationship with the decedent, particularly
in so far as it involved ill will or quarrels, would be presented
by the state as a part of its case against him. 8
This holding was enlarged in State v. Martin,9 9 which allowed evidence
of robberies in a first-degree murder prosecution without a Spreigl notice.
The robberies had a bearing on the relationship between the accused and
the victim because the alleged motive for 'the killing was fear that the vic-
tim would report the robberies. 100 By ignoring the word "directly" in its
prior holding, the court leaped from direct evidence of ill will between
defendant and victim to secondary evidence from which the relationship
had to be inferred.
B. Louisiana
Louisiana's statutes refer to the admissibility of evidence of similar
acts only for the purpose of showing intent and knowledge;' 0 1 evidentiary
treatment of dissimilar offenses is not specified by statute. The Louisiana
courts seem to have adopted the exclusionary rule with the standard set
of exceptions. 10° There is, however, some uncertainty over the treatment
of exceptions not specifically mentioned in the Code. In State v.
Prieur,'03 the defendant was convicted of the armed robbery of a bus
driver. Evidence of two other armed robberies was admitted. In one of
these incidents, the victim was driving a city bus, as in the crime for
which defendant was tried. The other robbery took place at a service
station. The court held evidence of the service station robbery inadmis-
sible and reversed.
10 4
The court reserved judgment on the admissibility of the earlier bus
95 Bilistrom's test of necessity still has life for cases under the identity exception.
State v. Maternowski,_ Minn. __, 209 N.W.2d 686, 687 (1973).
96 284 Minn. 242, 170 N.W.2d 104 (1969).
97 See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
98 284 Minn. at 260. 170 N.W.2d at 115.
99 293 Minn. 116, 197 N.W.2d 219 (1972).
100 293 Minn. at 128-29, 197 N.W.2d at 226-27.
101 LA. REV. STAT. §§ 15:445-46 (1967).
102 State v. Reinhardt, 229 La. 673, 86 So. 2d 530 (1956).
103 La. __, 277 So. 2d 126 (1973).
104 Id. at 129.
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robbery, 10 but promulgated a set of rules similar to those in Spreigl and
Billstrom, establishing prerequisites to the admission of any evidence of
other crimes. A pretrial notice describing the other act or offense "with
the general particularity required of an indictment or information"'1 6 is
required, although acts that are part of the res gestae and convictions
which are used to impeach defendant's testimony are excepted from this
requirement.10 The notice must contain a statement of the relevant ex-
ception;lu8 the state must show that the proffered evidence is not cumu-
lative; 10 9 and the -trial court must instruct the jury as to the limited pur-
pose of the evidence, both at the time it is received, if requested by the
defense, and in the judge's final charge to the jury. 110
Although there are several differences between the details of these rules
and those promulgated in Spreigl and Billstrom, only one is troublesome:
the requirement that the state specify in its pretrial notice the relevant
exception to the exclusionary rule. This requirement raises the possibility
that convictions will be reversed because the prosecution picked the wrong
exception. Considering the uncertain boundaries between the exceptions,
this possibility is very real. To avoid the necessity of relitigating many
cases, courts may allow the differences between the exceptions to be-
come even more confused in order to affirm more convictions. Another
approach might be to allow the state to "specify" every exception which
could arguably apply and then to permit the conviction to stand as long
as one of them is valid. This course, however, would seem to defeat the
purpose of the rule.
C. The Impact of the Minnesota
and Louisiana Rules
Spreigl is now more than eight years old, and it has had no revolution-
ary impact. The pretrial notice requirement has been called a "salutary
condition,""' but only Louisiana has adopted it. The idea has been pro-
posed to the Wisconsin court twice and has been rejected twice. 112 A
notice rule has also been turned down by the Eighth Circuit, which said
that the need for uniformity in the federal courts outweighed any benefit
that might flow from the rule." 3 No doubt a major reason for this cool
reception is the fear that any notice requirement will place impossible
burdens on prosecutors.
105 Id.





111 I J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 194d (Supp. 1972).
112 Cheney v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 454, 171 N.W.2d 339 (1969); Whitty v. State, 34
Wis. 2d 278, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967).
113 McConkey v. United States, 444 F.2d 788 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 885
(1971).
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Criminal justice is overburdened in our society. The addi-
tion of these five innovative requirements can only hamper and
further encumber the criminal dockets of our courts. More ev-
identiary hearings prior to trial, more delays in the actual con-
duct of the trial and more grounds for technical error will be
the inevitable result of this decision.
114
These objections seem to have some support, albeit less than unanimous,
among prosecutors themselves. 115 Another objection that has been
raised" 6 is the difficulty of specifying the other crime with sufficient
particularity 1 7 in certain cases, such as those involving stolen property
and child molestation.
Another important problem with these rules is the diminished pre-
dictability of the trial courts' evidentiary rulings. Because the admissibility
of certain evidence often determines the case's outcome, any uncertainty
in rulings makes it harder for prosecutors to decide whether or not to
bring charges."18 Since the decision to prosecute is an important water-
shed in the criminal justice process, such uncertainties could have impor-
tant implications for the process as a whole. Because of their limited
resources, most prosecutors prefer to charge only when they are reason-
ably certain of a conviction. Given the small number of cases that go to
trial, an effect at this pretrial stage may be more important than one at
the trial stage.
These notice rules also result in a number of inefficiencies. It is un-
clear, however, whether the inefficiencies are balanced by benefits of other
kinds. For example, an occasional delay for an evidentiary hearing" 9
may be a price the system should be willing to pay to ensure fairer trials.
Not until it is known how much prejudice is really caused by evidence of
other crimes can one be sure whether delays at and before trial should be
countenanced in order to keep such evidence away from the jury. Thus,
114 State v. Prieur, __ La. __, 277 So. 2d 126, 134 (1973) (Summers, J., dis-
senting).
115 Two sets of short questionnaires were sent to prosecutors. One set went to
seven District Attorneys in Louisiana, four of whom responded; the others went to
ten County Attorneys in Minnesota of whom five responded. Responses on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. No scientific sampling tech-
niques were used to select the recipients in either state, but both urban and rural
areas were represented. All of the Louisiana respondents agreed with Justice Summers'
prediction. Moreover, three of the four thought that Prieur would have an adverse
effect on the quality of criminal justice. The other expected the administration of
justice to be slowed, but foresaw no other significant effect. By comparison, only one
of the Minnesota prosecutors thought the Spreigl and its progeny had caused a de-
terioration in the quality of criminal justice, while two said there had been an im-
provement, and two saw no difference. The one pessimistic response may, however,
be entitled to extra weight because it came from Ramsey County (St. Paul).
116 Questionnaire response of Ramsey County, Minnesota, Attorney to author, on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
117 See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
118 Questionnaire response of Ramsey County, Minnesota, Attorney to author, on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reformi.
119 See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
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empirical studies of the prejudicial effects of evidence of other crimes are
essential to a sound evaluation of the rules concerning its admission.
V. CONCLUSION
The assumptions underlying the exclusionary rule have never been ad-
equately tested. Although experiments to test jury prejudice are difficult
to design, it should be possible to find one or more that would tell much
more than is now known about the need to exclude evidence of other
offenses. Without such knowledge, it is difficult to tell whether it is wiser
to surround the exclusionary rule with greater procedural safeguards, as
in Minnesota and Louisiana, or to discard it entirely in favor of the inclu-
sionary rule, as in Woods.
Absent more detailed knowledge, the inclusionary rule is more self-
consistent and less confusing than the exclusionary rule, without being
likely to precipitate unfair convictions.
At the same time, some of the safeguards established in Spreigi and its
progeny are useful regardless of the form of the evidentiary rule. The de-
fendant should have ample opportunity to refute testimony about his
other offenses because false evidence would surely be prejudicial under
any understanding of that word. The fact that other offenses do not have
to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt makes a false accusation of
another offense all the more dangerous. Pretrial notice gives the defense
an opportunity to refute this evidence. For a similar reason, pretrial notice
of the prosecution's legal ground for seeking to admit evidence of other
crimes would seem to be good practice. As this rule exists in Louisiana,
it calls for a statement of the applicable exception to the exclusionary rule,
but the same purpose could be served in jurisdictions following the inclu-
sionary rule by requiring a brief statement of the prosecutor's reason
for believing that the evidence is relevant. If applied too rigorously, this
specific notice rule could revive the hazards of the common-law forms of
action; 120 applied with good sense, it could move the evidentiary argu-
ments, which would otherwise be made during trial, to a pretrial phase,
and it could mean that counsel would be better prepared for them.
Limiting instructions to the jury are quite widely accepted. They are
readily separable from notice guidelines and could profitably be given
everywhere.
-Nickolas J. Kyser
120 See J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 288-93 (1968)
quoting excerpts from F. MAITLAND, EQUITY ALSO FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON
LAw (lst ed. 1909).
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